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Background: States’ pandemic influenza plans and school closure statutes are intended to guide state and local
officials, but most faced a great deal of uncertainty during the 2009 influenza H1N1 epidemic. Questions remained
about whether, when, and for how long to close schools and about which agencies and officials had legal
authority over school closures.
Methods: This study began with analysis of states’ school-closure statutes and pandemic influenza plans to identify
the variations among them. An agent-based model of one state was used to represent as constants a population’s
demographics, commuting patterns, work and school attendance, and community mixing patterns while repeated
simulations explored the effects of variations in school closure authority, duration, closure thresholds, and
reopening criteria.
Results: The results show no basis on which to justify statewide rather than school-specific or community-specific
authority for school closures. Nor do these simulations offer evidence to require school closures promptly at the
earliest stage of an epidemic. More important are criteria based on monitoring of local case incidence and on
authority to sustain closure periods sufficiently to achieve epidemic mitigation.
Conclusions: This agent-based simulation suggests several ways to improve statutes and influenza plans. First,
school closure should remain available to state and local authorities as an influenza mitigation strategy. Second,
influenza plans need not necessarily specify the threshold for school closures but should clearly define provisions
for early and ongoing local monitoring. Finally, school closure authority may be exercised at the statewide or local
level, so long as decisions are informed by monitoring incidence in local communities and schools.Background
School closure has long been considered a useful social-
distancing strategy to control the spread of infectious
diseases among children [1-4], who are efficient trans-
mitters of influenza virus [5,6] and whose immunity to
circulating virus strains may be lower than that of adults
[7]. School closures may delay an epidemic peak, allow-
ing more time for vaccine distribution and readying the
healthcare system (e.g., increasing available beds) [8].
Nevertheless, state and local officials faced uncertainty
during the 2009 influenza H1N1 epidemic about* Correspondence: mapotter@pitt.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orwhether, when, and for how long to close schools. Be-
tween April and May, the World Health Organization
and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
changed their advice from recommending closures un-
equivocally to deferring to state and local decision
makers [9,10]. But there was inconsistency as to which
agencies and officials had legal authority over school clo-
sures [11]. Moreover, the evidence base for when and
how long to close schools was sparse [12]. Though
ordered for some schools in spring, summer, and fall of
2009, school-closures were determined typically by local
school districts and individual schools; and closure dura-
tions rarely exceeded a few days [13,14]. It was reported
that H1N1 school closure experience had much local
variation in decision-making authority, disagreementtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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cials, and lack of clarity about the goals for closure [15].
A review of laboratory-confirmed H1N1 cases in Alberta,
Canada found that the 2009 summertime closure of
schools had interrupted virus transmission among
school-aged children but then failed to prevent a second
wave of the pandemic when schools re-opened in the
fall [16].
The relatively mild transmissibility and severity of the
2009 H1N1 disease contrasts with the reasonable ex-
pectation that another more virulent novel pandemic
disease will occur in the future—one accompanied by
surging demand for healthcare services, lack of a vac-
cine, and high morbidity and mortality rates. The need
remains to augment the evidence base and to plan
meaningfully for school closures.
First, should school closure authority as an influenza
mitigation strategy be centralized statewide or decentra-
lized locally? A single, statewide official with recognized
authority over all school districts and localities might
have greater effect in closing schools uniformly across a
state; whereas distributed authority among officials or
decentralized authority structure might cause delay or
non-uniformity in the timing of school closures deci-
sions and implementation. The effects of these policy
alternatives on the spread of infection are unknown.
Second, how early—that is, at what prevalence thres-
hold—should schools close to mitigate a pandemic?
School closures are costly [17-19], burdensome on work-
ers and families [20], and a potential cause of absenteeism
among public health workers [21]. Caution in imposing
such economic and social burdens must be balanced
against the health benefits; but neither past experience
nor empirical study has yet suggested sound metrics to
guide such decision-making.
Third, for how long should schools remain closed? A
previous study showed that increasing the duration of
school closures reduced the attack rate of infections in a
county population and that limiting the duration to two
weeks or less—when virus was still circulating—was
associated with increased attack rates [8]. Without em-
pirical evidence, the high costs of school closure could
exert pressure on school districts, individual schools,
and geographic localities to reopen too soon.
Establishing an evidence base for pandemic planning
is challenging, since school closure alternatives cannot
be tested in controlled observational studies, experience
with one influenza outbreak cannot necessarily be gen-
eralized to others, and isolating school closure as a
mitigation strategy from other social-distancing or
pharmaceutical interventions is infeasible in practice.
The present study avoided the limitations of observa-
tional studies by using a large-scale computational
model to provide insights and guidance for policymakers. Here, we conducted repeated simulations of
epidemics with specifications and assumptions held
constant while varying school closure policies and ob-
serving the outcomes.
Previous observational studies have analyzed epidemic
patterns and outcomes from actual experience in which
school closures were either coincident with a holiday or
vacation period [6]. Here, the purpose is to test the
epidemic implications of criterion-based school closure
decision making. Therefore, the simulations conducted
in this study use a pro-active approach to closures,
geared to the actual variations of authority and specifi-
cations found in state statutes and pandemic influenza
plans.Methods
This study began with analysis of school-closure statutes
and published pandemic influenza plans in all fifty U.S.
states and interpreted the variations among them for ap-
plication to modeling experiments. We chose to use the
population dynamics of one state (Pennsylvania) to rep-
resent constants for demographics, commuting patterns,
work and school attendance, and community mixing
patterns while repeated simulations explored variations
in delegation of school closure authority, closure dur-
ation, closure thresholds, and reopening criteria. Epi-
demic simulations using a large-scale agent-based model
explored whether and how the variations might affect
outcomes as measured by attack rate, peak pandemic
day, and peak case incidence.
Throughout this paper, we use the terms “pandemic”
and “epidemic” to denote separate meanings. “Pandemic”
refers to the H1N1 outbreak of 2009–2010 that was offi-
cially declared as such and describes the state plans so
labeled. “Epidemic” describes the results of the simulations
produced by our agent-based model.School closure statutes and pandemic influenza plans
An analysis of states’ school closure statutes and pan-
demic influenza plans identified variations influencing
the uniformity, timing, and duration of closures that lead
to a typology of school-closure authorities and criteria.
First, we re-analyzed data from a previously published
report [11] of school closure statutes to identify charac-
teristic ways of delegating school closure authority
among states. Statutes delegated a single state official
(14 states), one state official and one per-locality official
(14 states), a single per-locality official (15 states), or two
or more state officials and/or two or more per-locality
officials (4 states); there was no statutory designation of
authority in 3 states. These variations could affect
whether or not a school-closure order could be imple-
mented uniformly throughout a state and whether
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delays in implementation.
Second, we analyzed states’ pandemic influenza plans
to identify criteria for initiating and terminating school
closures. Every state had developed such a plan under
direction of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) during the avian influenza alert of
2005 and again in 2008. In the spring of 2010, we
downloaded and analyzed the plans then posted on
the DHHS website and followed links to state web-
sites for further information. When links were broken,
we added Google searches using the search phrase
“[state name] pandemic influenza plan,” which led to
the specified documents. These methods produced
complete plans for 45 states and plan summaries for 3
states (Iowa, North Dakota and Washington) but no
plan for 2 states (Massachusetts and Rhode Island); so
our analysis used only 48 state plans. These were dated
from 2005 to 2010, with the majority written in 2006. All
plan documents used in this analysis and downloaded in
portable document format (pdf ) are maintained on our
study’s website [22].
Almost all the plans discussed school closure as an in-
fluenza mitigation strategy. Closure criteria were either
stated as incidence at the state-wide or community-wide
level (35 states), indicating uncertainty as to whether
statewide uniformity or local autonomy is likely to be
more effective in mitigating the spread of infection.
However, plans rarely stated a specific incidence level to
trigger closures, probably reflecting the lack of evidence
to guide such advice. No closure criteria were mentioned
in 14 state plans. State plans had criteria for re-opening
schools either in-depth (13 states), or briefly (8 states),
or not at all (28 states). Again, the lack of specificity is
attributable to the lack of empirical evidence; however,
without such criteria for disease control, official decision
makers are left subject to economic and social pressures
to re-open schools from parents and employers.
Several examples illustrate how state planners have
dealt with the lack of empirical evidence to guide school
closure and re-opening thresholds. The Tennessee plan
states that schools are to be closed when three condi-
tions are met: 1) pandemic virus causing morbidity and
mortality in excess of seasonal influenza; 2) laboratory
confirmation of the pandemic virus in a county or sur-
rounding county; and 3) state surveillance indicating
community spread of the pandemic virus in the county
or a surrounding county. This plan specifies that schools
should re-open based on statewide criteria: when the
State Epidemiologist determines that “the pandemic
wave has subsided” based on sentinel surveillance. The
Kentucky plan instructs decision makers to "Collaborate
with the local school board for closing and re-opening of
school” [22]. The North Carolina plan asserts that “Nodata exists [sic] for recommending illness thresholds or
rates of change in number of illnesses that should lead
to consideration of dismissing or reopening schools”.
Interpretation of state variations for agent-based model
The typical variations among statutory authorities and
the uncertainties reflected in state plans are likely to
affect school closures in terms of statewide uniformity,
timing in relation to disease prevalence, and overall
duration. Further, these variations are likely to produce
differences in outcome of an epidemic, including attack
rate (infected and symptomatic individuals as a proportion
of total population), peak epidemic day, and peak case
incidence (number of cases by day). These are outcomes
that affect demand for healthcare services overall as well
as hospitalizations and mortality.
For the purpose of our simulations, the observed
variations in states’ statutes and pandemic plans are
captured in five “types”:
 Type I represents uniform statewide school closure
order based on a standard threshold of statewide
prevalence with all schools implementing closure
within 1 day and remaining closed for the specified
duration. We tested 1% prevalence for alternative
closure durations of 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 weeks; we also
tested 0.1% and 10% prevalence for the closure
duration of 8 weeks.
 Type II represents a local threshold for school
closure based on a standard of 5 cases in any school
at alternative closure durations of 1, 2, 4, 8, and
16 weeks.
 Type III is similar to Type I but varies the period of
implementation for a statewide closure order, testing
alternative implementation delays of 3, 5, and
10 days. Such delays could account for time needed
to resolve disagreements among state and/or local
officials holding concurrent authority for decision
making.
 Type IV represents lack of statewide uniformity by
introducing randomness in the threshold for
closures at the individual school level: 1 to 3 cases,
1 to 5 cases, and 1 to 10 cases. For example, in the
1–3 case scenario, each school in the model has a
random chance of closing at either 1, 2, or 3 days
after a closure order; in the 1–5 case scenario, each
school has a random chance of closing at 1, 2, 3, 4,
or 5 days after a closure order. For all scenarios each
school, once closed, remains closed for the specified
duration.
 Type V represents how local pressures might limit
the duration of closures by randomly re-opening
schools before the specified duration. Prematurity
alternatives of 1–3 days, 1–10 days, 1–20 days,
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alternative scenario determined when any particular
school would re-open.
Agent-based model and epidemic simulation
An agent-based model represented each individual per-
son living in the state of Pennsylvania and was similar in
design to previously described models of Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania [8,23], and the Washington, DC
metropolitan area [24,25]. The complete list of data
sources appears in Table 1.
A geospatially explicit human agent database, termed a
synthetic population, represented the state of Pennsylvania
in the year 2000. Each agent was assigned to a household,
so that at the census tract level the synthetic population
contained realistic distributions of households, and agent
demographics. Thus, the model depicted the region’s indi-
vidual households, schools (K-12), workplaces, and health-
care facilities, with agents assigned to each using previously
described methods and the following data sources: schools
and school assignments—U.S. Department of Education
National Center for Education Statistics (public schools
data) and private data vendor (private schools); workplaces
and workplace assignments—U.S. Census Standard Tabula-
tion Product (STP64) commuting pattern data and ESRI
Business Analyst (InfoUSA business data).
It is assumed that when the epidemic starts, schools
are open. On weekends, students do not go to school andTable 1 Data Sources for Pennsylvania School Closure Model
Specification/Calibration Data Source
Pennsylvania population, with distributions by age,
sex, employment status, and household location
PA model represents
that reside in close g
Method to extract th
by Beckman et al. [26
Pennsylvania data fro
aggregated data [27]
Pennsylvania location specifications 316,148 workplaces (
4,319 schools (Nation
4,779,182 households
Microdata files and C
Students assigned to schools Overall methodology
Pennsylvania data on
(National Center for E
Employed adults assigned employment locations Pennsylvania data on
US Census Standard
Transmission site assumptions for homes, schools,
worksites, and communities
Calibrate to a pandem
illness) with 33%, 12.
workplace, schools a
Natural history param
given in Table 1 of re
R0 = 1.2, 1.6, and 2.0
produce approximateinstead have increased activity in their neighborhoods
and communities. For each scenario, the results pre-
sented are the average of 20 stochastic simulation runs, a
number sufficient to obtain statistically significant results
from computed confidence intervals. Each simulation
weekday, agents moved among their respective house-
holds, their assigned workplaces (or schools depending
on their age), and various locations in the community,
where they interacted with other proximal agents based
on the rates in Table 2. Agents interacted more fre-
quently with agents with whom they had close rela-
tionships (e.g., family members, household members,
classmates, and office mates). Employees of large firms
interacted more closely with their office mates but also
encountered people working in different offices of the
same firm. Workers in firms having only one office re-
peatedly contact the same people each day.
The model implements school closures by halting the
contacts occurring when schools are open. During clo-
sures, alternative contact patterns are implemented, as
specified above.
Disease parameters and model calibration
An underlying Susceptible- Exposed-Infectious-Recovered
(SEIR) disease model governed disease progression and
transmission. At the start of each simulation run, all
people are susceptible (S) to influenza, based on the
assumption of an entirely novel virus. On Simulation
Day 1, introduction of 100 infectious individuals intoa population of 11,863,395 people (This excludes populations
roup quarters such as prisons)
e agent population from Census data was developed
].
m US Census Bureau’s Public Use Microdata files and Census
.
ESRI Business Analyst GIS data product)
al Center for Education Statistics [28])
(Pennsylvania data from US Census Bureau’s Public Use
ensus aggregated data [27])
described [29].
public and private schools and school assignments
ducation Statistics [28])
workplaces [30] and workplace assignments were taken from
Tabulation Product (STP64) and ESRI Business Analyst GIS respectively.
ic of R0 = 1.4 (approximately 34% of population has symptomatic
5%, 24.5% and 30% of transmissions occurring in the household,
nd community respectively [31].
eters for transmission probabilities under varying conditions are
ference [31].
were simulated by scaling the transmissibility of the disease to
ly 19%, 36% and 45% symptomatic illness in the population respectively.
Table 2 Model Transmission and Person-to-Person
Contact Parameter Values [32]
Contact Group Infected Susceptible Value
Household Adult Adult .4
Household Child Adult .3
Household Adult Child .3
Household Child Child .6
School Elementary Student Elementary Student .0435
School Middle Student Middle Student .0375
School High Student High Student .0315
Workplace Adult Adult .0575
Hospital HCW HCW .0575
Hospital HCW Patient .01
Hospital Patient HCW .01
Neighborhood All Child .0000145
Neighborhood All Adult .000725
Community All Child .00003175
Community All Adult .00018125
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individual who contacts an infectious individual has a
probability of contracting influenza (Table 2) derived from
prior studies of the 1957–8 Asian influenza pandemic.
Each newly infected person then moves to the exposed (E)
state for the duration of the disease's incubation period
and then to the infectious state (I) where the person could
infect others. One-half of infectious patients exhibit symp-
toms, 50% of sick students and workers stay home with
no community contacts unless they see a doctor, and 40%
of symptomatic patients visit a clinic or emergency room.
Following the infectious period, the agent proceeds to the
recovered state (R), in which he or she is immune to sub-
sequent infections. Initial calibration of this model utilized
the Ferguson et al. approach with data from historical
(1957–58, 1968–69) influenza pandemics and targeted an
epidemic with a 35% attack rate seen in the 1957–58
pandemic [33-36].
The mitigating effect of the weekend on influenza
transmission has been widely reported [37,38]. For ex-
ample, the study by Hens et al. in eight European coun-
tries estimated a 10 ~ 20% reduction in influenza
infections during weekend when compared to weekdays
[37]. A primary reason is that most workplaces and
schools are closed simultaneously during the weekend,
and thus fewer human contacts take place as opposed
to weekdays. For instance, a survey by McCaw et al.
indicated that an individual has 2 ~ 4 more personal
contacts during weekend than weekdays [39].
Cauchemez et al. [40] in a study of influenza spread in
France showed that extended holidays result in a 20–29%
reduction in the rate influenza as transmitted to childrenbut have no detectable effect on the contact patterns of
adults. Holidays prevent 16–18% of seasonal influenza
cases (18–21% in children). By extrapolation, we find that
prolonged school closure during an epidemic might
reduce the cumulative number of cases by 13–17%
(18–23% in children) and peak attack rates by up to
39–45% (47–52% in children). Of course this impact
would be reduced if the reduced contact rates among
children cannot be maintained for a prolonged period.
With respect to workers, the US labor force of
154 million people as of August 2009 spent an average
of 7.9 hours per weekday and 5.6 hours per weekend
day working, presumably interacting closely with each
other and clients [41].
For our model on weekends, schools and many work-
places are closed. We assume that, then, 50% of student
agents increase their community interactions by 50% for
an average of 25% increase which approximates those in
[39]. A minority (20%) of employees continued to work
and maintain their normal weekday level contacts on
weekends. We also assumed that 50% of sick students
and workers stayed at home and did not interact with
anyone outside of the household. Our workplace absen-
tee rate is consistent with other models but slightly
higher than published employee absenteeism estimates
during an influenza epidemic that range from 10 to
40 percent (see Thanner et al. [42]). However, we used
a school absentee rate that is lower than some models
(Ferguson et al. [D] use a 90% absentee rate), but
higher than those reported during the 1957–58 epi-
demic. For example, Henderson et al. [41] indicate that
over 60% of students had clinical illnesses during the
autumn of 1957 and that data from 28 U.S. school
systems showed increases of 20% to 30% absenteeism
above normal. The rates in New York City were a lit-
tle higher, with school absenteeism reaching 29% of all
school attendees and 43% for Manhattan.
This agent-based model was programmed in C++.
Simulations were run at the Pittsburgh Supercomputing
Center on its Blacklight architecture. As reported in this
paper, each result is the average of 20 successfully
initiated epidemics, each of which was run in parallel on
a separate compute core (PC computer). Each simula-
tion required 15 minutes.
Results
Simulation results are illustrated by overall attack rate in
the population defined the percentage of total popula-
tion both infected and symptomatic (Table 3) for the
five Types of school closure authority. At baseline with
no school closures, influenza attack rates were 20% at
R0 = 1.2, over 36% at R0 = 1.6, and 47% at R0 = 2.0.
These represent the ranges of rates previously reported
for seasonal influenza combining all population ages
Table 3 Attack Rates* of Novel Influenza with Transmissibility of R0 = 1.2, 1.6, and 2.0 without School Closure
(baseline) and under Five Types of State School Closure Authority
School Closure
Authority
Closure Threshold Closure Duration Attack Rates *
R0=1.2 R0=1.6 R0=2.0
Baseline None None 20% 36% 47%
TYPE I 1% statewide prevalence,
1-day implementation
1 week 19% 36% 46%
2 weeks 19% 36% 46%
4 weeks 19% 35% 45%
8 weeks 14% 33% 43%
16 weeks 2% 27% 43%
TYPE I variation 0.1% statewide prevalence 8 weeks 16% 35% 43%
10% statewide prevalence 8 weeks 12% 31% 44%
TYPE II 5 cases per school 1 week 19% 36% 47%
2 weeks 19% 36% 46%
4 weeks 19% 35% 44%
8 weeks 14% 32% 43%
16 weeks 2% 27% 43%
TYPE III 1% prevalence, 3-day delay 8 weeks 14% 32% 43%
1% prevalence, 5-day delay 8 weeks 13% 31% 44%
1% prevalence, 10-day delay 8 weeks 10% 33% 46%
TYPE IV Random, 1–3 cases per school 8 weeks 16% 32% 43%
Random, 1–5 cases per school 8 weeks 15% 32% 43%
Random, 1–10 cases per school 8 weeks 16% 32% 43%
TYPE V 5 cases per school Random, re-open 1–3 days before 8 weeks 15% 32% 43%
5 cases per school Random, re-open 1–10 days before 8 weeks 17% 33% 43%
5 cases per school Random, re-open 1–20 days before 8 weeks 18% 33% 43%
5 cases per school Random, re-open 1–30 days before 8 weeks 18% 33% 44%
*Infected and symptomatic individuals as a percentage of total population.
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et al. for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic for the school-age
population alone [16]. For all Types and at all transmis-
sibility levels, the attack rates among school children
were higher than among adults (data not presented).
With uniform statewide closures in Type I, there was
little effect on attack rates unless schools were closed for
at least 8 weeks at any R0 tested. At low R0 of 1.2, an
8-week closure resulted in a 14% attack rate when
triggered by a 1% statewide prevalence. At higher R0’s
of 1.6 and 2.0, school closures of any duration had lit-
tle effect on attack rates.
The Type I variations of prevalence threshold with
low R0 of 1.2 produced counter-intuitive results: the
lower statewide prevalence threshold of 0.1% had a
higher (16%) attack rate; and the higher statewide
prevalence threshold of 10% had a lower (12%) attack
rate. These differences have been observed in our pre-
viously published school closure studies [8,19], and
arise from shifting the school-closure period to later,
thus having greater impact on the peak and durationof the epidemic curve. This also explains why the
benefit of using a higher prevalence threshold disap-
pears from the results at higher R0s, when the epi-
demic peak occurs earlier.
With Type II using a local threshold (5 cases per
school), attack rates resulting from closures of various
durations were the same as those with statewide uni-
form threshold (1% prevalence). Figure 1 graphically
shows Type II, which uses a 5-case per school trigger
and 1-day implementation. For R0 = 1.2, the peak inci-
dence is about 140,000 with 1 week closure; 134,000
with 2 weeks; 120,000 with 4 weeks; 94,500 with
8 weeks; and 12,000 with 16 weeks; the peak day is
later for 1, 2, 4, and 8 weeks of closure (day 52, 56,
76, and 112, respectively) but earlier for 16 weeks of
closure (day 32). For R0s of 1.6 and 2.0, the peak is
lower at each successively longer duration of closure,
but nearly all peaks are both earlier and higher than
for the same closure durations at R0 = 1.2. At R0 = 1.6
the latest peak (day 52) occurs with a 4-week closure,



























































































Figure 1 Type II - Cases per day with 5-case per-school closure
threshold for varied durations at R0 = 1.2, 1.6, and 2.0.
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sures are 2 weeks or less. At R0 = 2.0, transmission
occurs so rapidly that the peak day occurs between 29
and 32 regardless of closure duration. Also at this high
R0, increasing closure durations reduced the peak inci-
dence successively from over 600,000 at 1 week, to
480,694 at 2 weeks; but beyond closure duration of
4 weeks with 419,644 cases, longer closures produced
little further reduction of incidence, which remained
above 400,000 cases with both 8- and 16-week closures.
Type III tested another approach to altering state-
wide uniformity of closure threshold: by delaying im-
plementation, the effective prevalence of infections was
allowed to rise before schools were actually closed. AtR0 = 1.2, compared with the attack rate of 14% from
1-day implementation based on 1% statewide preva-
lence, 3-day delay made no difference (14% attack
rate), 5-day delay brought improvement (13% attack
rate), and 10-day delay brought even further improve-
ment (10% attack rate). As with the Type I variation
of prevalence threshold, these results arise from shifting
the school-closure period to later in the epidemic. How-
ever, at higher R0s, the delay-related shifting of school
closure period produced no benefit because of the epi-
demics’ earlier peaks.
Type IV shows the effect of deferring to local decision
makers and locally determined closure thresholds. Here,
with low R0 (1.2) virus transmissibility, allowing ran-
domness among individual schools in the case number
to trigger an 8-week closure resulted in attack rates little
different than requiring a statewide trigger of 5 cases
(14%): 1–3 day triggers had a 16% attack rate; 1–5 day
triggers had a 15% attack rate; and 1–10 day triggers had
a 15% attack rate. At the higher R0s, local randomness
in closure triggers had no effect on attack rates, which
remained at 43%—the same as with statewide 5-case
triggers.
Figure 2 shows how with Type IV the epidemic peaks
varied as a function of changing the threshold for initiat-
ing an 8-week school closure. At all R0’s tested and re-
gardless of whether the per-school case incidence
threshold was uniform or randomized, the peak day and
peak incidence were very similar. However, at R0 = 1.2,
the random 1–5 case threshold produced a slightly
later peak (day 108) than the alternatives (all at day 104);
and notably, at R0 = 1.2 and 1.6, random thresholds
(1–5 cases and 1–10 cases, respectively) produced
slightly lower case incidences (91,000 cases and
142,000 cases, respectively) than using the uniform
5-case closure threshold (104,000 and 144,000 cases,
respectively). At R0 = 2.0, using the 1–3 case random
threshold resulted in higher incidence than the uniform
and random threshold alternatives (425,286 cases com-
pared to alternatives approximating 407,000 cases).
Type V shows how failure to sustain a school closure
for the full 8 weeks for low R0 virus slightly erodes
the benefit on attack rates. Compared with attack rate
of 14% for full 8-week closure, the rates are 15% with
3-day premature re-opening, 17% with 10-day premature
re-opening, and 18% with 20-day or 30-day premature
re-opening.
Figure 3 shows with Type V the effects of prematurely
re-opening schools. The figure shows epidemic peaks
when 8-week closures initiated by a 5-case per-school
threshold are prematurely terminated by 3, 10, 20, and
30 days. At R0 = 1.2, premature re-openings produced
successively earlier and higher peaks, except that the
























































































Figure 2 Type IV - Cases per day for 8-week closure duration




























































































Figure 3 Type V - Cases per day with varied per-school
re-openings before 8 weeks at R0 = 1.2, 1.6, and 2.0.
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Table 1) and eroding the benefit of the 8-week closure
period. At R0 = 1.6, the peak occurs at day 40 regardless
of premature re-opening schedule, and the incidence var-
ies only slightly among them (between 141,000 and
146,000). At R0 = 2.0, the peak occurs at day 28 regard-
less of premature re-opening, and the incidence again
varies only slightly among them (between 399,000 and
406,000 cases).
For 8-week closures with R0s of 1.6 and 2.0, there is
little or no change in peak day or incidence whether
school closure threshold is standardized at 5-cases perschool (Type II) or randomized at 1–3, 1–5, and 1–10
cases per school (Type IV) or whether there is prema-
ture re-opening (Type V).
Discussion
These simulation experiments permit comparisons
among the states’ various delegations of school closure
authority and their variations in specificity for criteria
determining the uniformity, timing, and duration of
school closure as an influenza mitigation strategy.
On the question of whether centralized statewide au-
thority is advantageous for epidemic mitigation, these
results show no basis for justification. There is little dif-
ference in effectiveness as measured by attack rate
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At low virus transmissibility (R0 = 1.2), the more import-
ant factor is the duration of closure: attack rates remain
high unless closures last 8 weeks or more. When trans-
missibility of infection is high (R0 = 1.6 and 2.0), even
differences in closure duration have little effect on attack
rates. But transmissibility is difficult to discern in an on-
going epidemic; and lengthy closures impose social and
economic burdens on communities and families. There-
fore, the school closure decision might reasonably be
devolved to local officials who understand, and are ac-
countable for, health issues and socio-economic con-
cerns of local populations.
School-specific closure criteria, though absent from
most states’ existing epidemic influenza plans, appear to
be important in disease control because of the dynamics
of transmission. Influenza arrives in localities at different
times, and commuting and mixing patterns vary locally
[35,36]. Thus, even if the case-per-school closure thresh-
old is non-uniform across school districts and communi-
ties, there is a disease-control benefit to local
responsiveness. Again, these results do not outweigh the
possible advantage of decision-making by knowledgeable
local authorities.
On the question of prevalence threshold for school
closure, these simulations offer no evidence to support
school closures promptly at the earliest stage of an epi-
demic, given the need for an 8-week closure period and
the typically unknown transmissibility of the virus dur-
ing an epidemic. At low R0, delaying closures shifts the
closure period further toward the epidemic peak. At
higher R0s, this shift is irrelevant because the epidemic
peak occurs so rapidly; and so closing schools at all has
minimal effect. Again, since transmissibility is usually
unknown during an epidemic, there may be an advan-
tage to delaying school closures while monitoring in-
creasing case numbers over a week or two at the
individual community or school level.
An interesting observation concerns the timing of
school closures. Earn et al. reported that school closure
of 8 to 10 weeks in summer for the 2009 H1N1 pan-
demic in Alberta, Canada was followed by a spike in the
fall infection rate (a so-called “second wave” of the pan-
demic) [16]. This effect also appears in our simulation
results, when uniform, statewide closures initiated early
in an epidemic delays the peak incidence but does not
quench the epidemic.On the question of when to re-
open, these results show that the duration of school clo-
sures affects not only attack rate but also peak day and
peak incidence. Closures of 1–2 weeks or more, regard-
less of R0 or closure threshold, did not reduce attack
rates but did delay the epidemic peak. Such brief clo-
sures offer the potential for reducing a likely surge in de-
mand for healthcare services. Closures of less than8 weeks may also allow time to use other influenza miti-
gation strategies such as distribution of vaccines and
anti-viral medications.
These interpretations are influenced by recent experi-
ence of the H1N1 pandemic of 2009–10, which caused
relatively mild illness. However, a more dangerous influ-
enza virus might alter the implications of these results.
When an influenza virus causes only mild disease, long-
duration school closure may be economically and so-
cially infeasible. But when influenza brings high rates of
hospitalization and mortality, there may be weaker eco-
nomic and social pressures against school closures.
Then, longer school closure periods may have greater
sustainability for households and workplaces as well as
greater importance for disease control.
Limitations
All computer models are simplifications of reality and can
never account for every possible factor or interaction.
Each result presented represents an average of 20
simulation runs. This number is sufficient to demon-
strate that the overall attack rates reported have only
small variances at the model aggregate level. However,
the distribution of more granular results, such as indi-
vidual schools, would not demonstrate stability with 20
replicates.
This model explores in isolation the existing variations
on school-closure authorities and specifications, though
in reality this strategy might be combined with other
social-distancing measures as well as pharmaceutical
interventions such as vaccination.
Conclusions
Decision makers need evidence on which to base school
closure plans and procedures; but since controlled empir-
ical studies of school closures are infeasible, computa-
tional modeling offers a useful alternative. A future
influenza pandemic and its circumstances may not con-
form to the data and assumptions that our model drew
from referenced sources or from previously published
models. Thus, rather than dictate particular policy deci-
sions, this model provides information to decision makers
about possible results under a selected set of scenarios. It
suggests ways to improve statutes and influenza plans by
revealing the relative importance of criteria for decision
making based on the competing priorities of epidemic
mitigation and socio-economic advantage.
First, school closure should remain an optional strat-
egy for influenza mitigation, given the uncertainties
about virus transmissibility and disease severity that be-
devil the early stages of an epidemic. Allowing for
decentralized, local control over school-closure decisions
may not affect attack rates and may improve responsive-
ness to local priorities and needs.
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necessarily be specified in states’ influenza plans, but
provisions for early and ongoing local monitoring of
case numbers should be well defined. It is important
to avoid the risk contact-mixing among susceptible
school children when the virus is still circulating
widely—a situation more reliably observed at the com-
munity level rather than statewide.
Third, school closure authority may be exercised at
the statewide or local level, so long as decisions are
informed by monitoring incidence in local communities
and schools. Local control may be important because
of social and economic concerns about prolonged
school closures, which local officials can weigh against
the risks of disease perhaps more sensitively than state-
wide officials.
Fourth, depending on the transmissibility of an influ-
enza virus, somewhat brief school closures of 1–2 weeks
can help to reduce a surge in demand for healthcare ser-
vices. Thus, school closures might be combined with
other social-distancing strategies and with pharmaceut-
ical interventions such as vaccinations.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
MAP conceptualized this study, participated in design of modeling
experiments, assisted in the interpretation of statutes and pandemic plans,
and drafted the manuscript. STB participated in design of modeling
experiments, developed the model, performed the modeling experiments,
assisted in interpretation of the modeling results, and helped to draft the
manuscript. PMS assisted in the conceptualization of the study, assisted with
legal and policy data acquisition, created methodology for interpretation of
statutes and pandemic plans, assisted in drafting of the manuscript. TBH
participated in the study design, analyzed state school closure statutes and
state pandemic plans, and helped to draft the manuscript. PCC developed
the initial ABM, aided in model validations, and helped to draft the
manuscript. SMG assisted in the conceptualization of the study design and
helped to draft the manuscript. BYL contributed to the conceptualization
and design of the model, interpretation of results, and drafting of the
manuscript. CRK assisted in identifying data, participated in analysis, and
edited the manuscript. JG contributed to the design of the model, the
analysis and interpretation of the data, and helped to draft the manuscript.
DSB made substantial contributions to conceptualizing how legal criteria
could be used in a computational model and to the overall study design. All
authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Institute of General Medical
Sciences MIDAS grant 1U54GM088491-01. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of
the manuscript. This work was funded through the Center for Public Health
Practice by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (cooperative
agreement 5P01TP000304). Its contents are solely the responsibility of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.
Author details
1Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, USA. 2Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, USA. 3RTI International, Research Triangle Park, Durham, North
Carolina, USA. 4School of Medicine, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, USA.Received: 30 March 2012 Accepted: 9 November 2012
Published: 14 November 2012References
1. Glass LM, Glass RJ: Social contact networks for the spread of pandemic
influenza in children and teenagers. BMC Publ Health 2008, 8:61.
2. Mikolajczyk RT, Akmatov MK, Rastin S, Kretzschmar M: Social contacts of
school children and the transmission of respiratory-spread pathogens.
Epidemiol Infect 2008, 136(6):813–822.
3. Hens N, Goeyvaerts N, Aerts M, Shkedy Z, Van Damme P, Beutels P: Mining
social mixing patterns for infectious disease models based on a two-day
population survey in Belgium. BMC Infect Dis 2009, 9:5.
4. Koonin LM, Cetron MS: School closure to reduce influenza transmission.
Emerg Infect Dis 2009, 15(1):137–138. author reply 138.
5. Glezen WP: Emerging infections: pandemic influenza. Epidemiol Rev 1996,
18(1):64–76.
6. Markel H, Lipman HB, Navarro JA, Sloan A, Michalsen JR, Stern AM, Cetron
MS: Nonpharmaceutical interventions implemented by US cities during
the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic. JAMA 2007, 298(6):644–654.
7. Halder N, Kelso JK, Milne GJ: Developing guidelines for school closure
interventions to be used during a future influenza pandemic.
BMC Infect Dis 2010, 10:221.
8. Lee BY, Brown ST, Cooley P, Potter MA, Wheaton WD, Voorhees RE, Stebbins
S, Grefenstette JJ, Zimmer SM, Zimmerman RK, et al: Simulating school
closure strategies to mitigate an influenza epidemic. J Public Health Man
2010, 16(3):252–261.
9. Human infection with new influenza A (H1N1) virus: WHO Consultation on
suspension of classes and restriction of mass gatherings to mitigate the
impact of epidemics caused by influenza A (H1N1), May 2009. Releve
epidemiologique hebdomadaire / Section d'hygiene du Secretariat de la Societe
des Nations = Weekly epidemiological record / Health Section of the Secretariat
of the League of Nations 2009, 84(27):269–271.
10. Update on school (K-12) and child care programs: Interim CDC guidance in
response to human infections with the novel influenza A (H1N1) virus
[homepage on the internet]. http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/schools/.
11. Hodge JG, Bhattacharya D, Gray J: Legal preparedness for school closures in
response to pandemic influenza and other emergencies. A report submitted to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: The Center for Law and the
Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities; 2008.
12. Bell DM: Non-pharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza,
national and community measures. Emerg Infect Dis 2006, 12(1):88–94.
13. H1N1 flu & U.S. Schools: Answers to frequently asked questions.
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/pandemic/
guidance/flu-faqs.pdf.
14. U.S. Department of Education: 2009 Year in Review; 2010:7–8.
Accessed 11/13/12 at http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/
2009review.html.
15. Klaiman T, Kraemer JD, Stoto MA: Variability in school closure decisions in
response to 2009 H1N1: a qualitative systems improvement analysis.
BMC Publ Health 2011, 11:73.
16. Earn DJ, He D, Loeb MB, Fonseca K, Lee BE, Dushoff J: Effects of school
closure on incidence of pandemic influenza in Alberta, Canada.
Ann Intern Med 2012, 156(3):173–181.
17. Sadique MZ, Adams EJ, Edmunds WJ: Estimating the costs of school
closure for mitigating an influenza pandemic. BMC Publ Health 2008,
8:135.
18. Lempel H, Epstein JM, Hammond RA: Economic cost and health care
workforce effects of school closures in the U.S. PLoS currents 2009,
1:RRN1051.
19. Brown ST, Tai JH, Bailey RR, Cooley PC, Wheaton WD, Potter MA, Voorhees
RE, LeJeune M, Grefenstette JJ, Burke DS, et al: Would school closure for
the 2009 H1N1 influenza epidemic have been worth the cost? a
computational simulation of Pennsylvania. BMC Publ Health 2011, 11:353.
20. Berkman BE: Mitigating pandemic influenza: the ethics of implementing
a school closure policy. J Public Health Man 2008, 14(4):372–378.
21. Dalton CB, Durrheim DN, Conroy MA: Likely impact of school and
childcare closures on public health workforce during an influenza
pandemic: a survey. Commun Dis Intell 2008, 32(2):261–262.
22. Archived State Pandemic Influenza Plans [MIDAS Website].
http://bit.ly/archivedpandemicfluplans.
Potter et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:977 Page 11 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/97723. Cooley P, Lee BY, Brown S, Cajka J, Chasteen B, Ganapathi L, Stark JH,
Wheaton WD, Wagener DK, Burke DS: Protecting health care workers: a
pandemic simulation based on Allegheny County. Influenza Other Respi
Viruses 2010, 4(2):61–72.
24. Lee BY, Brown ST, Cooley PC, Zimmerman RK, Wheaton WD, Zimmer SM,
Grefenstette JJ, Assi TM, Furphy TJ, Wagener DK, et al: A computer
simulation of employee vaccination to mitigate an influenza epidemic.
Am J Prev Med 2010, 38(3):247–257.
25. Lee BY, Brown ST, Korch GW, Cooley PC, Zimmerman RK, Wheaton WD,
Zimmer SM, Grefenstette JJ, Bailey RR, Assi TM, et al: A computer
simulation of vaccine prioritization, allocation, and rationing during the
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Vaccine 2010, 28(31):4875–4879.
26. Beckman RJ, Baggerly K, McKay M: Creating synthetic baseline
populations. Transport Res A-Pol 1996, 30(6):415–429.
27. Public-Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). http://www.census.gov/main/www/
pums.html.
28. Common Core of Data: Build A Table. http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/.
29. Cajka JC, Cooley PC, Wheaton WD: Attribute Assignment to a Synthetic
Population in Support of Agent-Based Disease Modeling. RTI Press publication
No. MR-0019-1009. Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International; 2010.
Retrieved [date] from http://www.rti.org/rtipress.
30. Census 2000 special tabulation: Census tract of work by Census tract of
residence (STP 64). http://www.census.gov/mp/www/cat/decennial_census_
2000/census_2000_special_tabulation_census_tract_of_work_by_census_
tract_of_residence_stp_64.html.
31. Cooley P, Brown S, Cajka J, Chasteen B, Ganapathi L, Grefenstette J,
Hollingsworth CR, Lee BY, Levine B, Wheaton WD, et al: The role of subway
travel in an influenza epidemic: a New York City simulation. J Urban
Health 2011, 88(5):982–995.
32. Germann TC, Kadau K, Longini IM Jr, Macken CA: Mitigation strategies for
pandemic influenza in the United States. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2006,
103(15):5935–5940.
33. Longini AN I, Xu S, et al: Containing pandemic influenza at the source.
Science 2005, 309:1083–1087.
34. Germann T, Kadau K, Longini IJ, Macken C: Mitigation strategies for
Pandemic Influenza in the United States. PNAS 2006, 103(15):5935–5940.
35. Ferguson N, Cummings D, Cauchemez S, et al: Strategies for containing an
emerging influenza pandemic in Southeast Asia. Nature 2005,
437:209–214.
36. Ferguson NM, Cummings DA, Fraser C, Cajka JC, Cooley PC, Burke DS:
Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic. Nature 2006,
442(7101):448–452.
37. Hens N, Ayele GM, Goeyvaerts N, Aerts M, Mossong J, Edmunds JW,
Beutels P: Estimating the impact of school closure on social mixing
behaviour and the transmission of close contact infections in eight
European countries. BMC Infect Dis 2009, 9:187.
38. Aledort JE, Lurie N, Wasserman J, Bozzette SA: Non-pharmaceutical public
health interventions for pandemic influenza: an evaluation of the
evidence base. BMC Publ Health 2007, 7:208.
39. Occupational Employment Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/OES/Current/
OES_Nat.htm.
40. Cauchemez S, Valleron AJ, Boelle PY, Flahault A, Ferguson NM: Estimating
the impact of school closure on influenza transmission from Sentinel
data. Nature 2008, 452(7188):750–754.
41. Henderson DA, Courtney B, Inglesby TV, Toner E, Nuzzo JB: Public health
and medical responses to the 1957–58 influenza pandemic. Biosecur
Bioterror 2009, 7(3):265–273.
42. Thanner MH, Links JM, Meltzer MI, Scheulen JJ, Kelen GD: Understanding
estimated worker absenteeism rates during an influenza pandemic.
Am J Disaster Med 2011, 6(2):89–105.
43. Basta NE, Chao DL, Halloran ME, Matrajt L, Longini IM Jr: Strategies for
pandemic and seasonal influenza vaccination of schoolchildren in the
United States. Am J Epidemiol 2009, 170(6):679–686.
doi:10.1186/1471-2458-12-977
Cite this article as: Potter et al.: School closure as an influenza
mitigation strategy: how variations in legal authority and plan criteria
can alter the impact. BMC Public Health 2012 12:977.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
